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Introduction
During the recent financial crisis, many newspapers reported a "flight to gold" (e.g., The Telegraph, January 6, 2008). Investors consider gold a safe investment because it is a hard store of value. Thus, in times of financial uncertainty and extraordinary provision of liquidity by many central banks, gold and other commodities are seen as safer investments than stocks, currencies, or other financial products. However, de facto, gold prices are almost as volatile as S&P 500 returns. 1 Therefore, one should view gold, or other commodities, as just another asset in an investor's portfolio that is influenced by the same macroeconomic news as are other financial assets. In line with this view, Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) document a relationship between monetary policy news and commodity prices.
Thus, according to Frankel's (1986) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , the standard deviation of gold (S&P 500) returns is 1.15 (1.37). For both assets, the standard deviation increases considerably during the financial crisis starting on August 7, 2007: gold, 1.62; S&P 500, 2.08. 2 Empirical evidence for the influence of monetary policy actions on commodity prices is provided (among others) by Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) and Frankel and Rose (2010) . Barsky and Kilian (2004) show that monetary policy stance is useful as a predictor of commodity prices. Finally, Bernanke et al. (1997) illustrate that oil price shocks induce a monetary policy response that can amplify the contractionary effects of the oil price shock itself.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of monetary policy news and presents the econometric methodology. In Section 3, we illustrate our results. Section 4 concludes with the policy implications of our findings.
Data and Empirical Methodology
In our analysis, we use a new data set introduced and described in detail in Hayo et al. (2008 Hayo et al. ( , 2011 . One of the advantages of this data set is that it covers the recent crisis period. The data set contains 837 speeches and 201 congressional hearings by Board of Governors members, as well as 94 post-meeting statements and 26 monetary policy reports (MPR). Our analysis incorporates a subset of these events: only those communications containing information on either the U.S. economic outlook or the Fed's future monetary policy course are included. In addition to these (informal) communications, we also analyze expected target rate changes and target rate change surprises. 4 Finally, we integrate several variables controlling for the unorthodox measures undertaken by the Fed during the financial crisis. 5 Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the frequency of these events.
Our commodity indicators comprise daily growth rates on five sub-indices of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index over the period 1998-2009 (2,993 observations): agricultural, energy, livestock, industrial metals, and precious metals. 6 Descriptive statistics show that all series exhibit excess kurtosis, but almost no skewness, indicating volatility clustering (Engle, 1982) . Thus, we employ the following GARCH(1,1) specification (Bollerslev, 1986 ): Communication lowers price volatility over the whole sample. This is in line with findings by Hayo et al. (2008) , who obtain similar results for U.S. bond and equity markets.
Empirical Results
They interpret this as an indication of central bankers' role as financial market "psychologists." By communicating with the public, they can calm the market. During the financial crisis, we mostly find a positive interaction effect for the communication variables.
This implies that the "calming" effect is partly offset as, apparently, central bank news requires an adjustment of portfolios. However, only in the case of livestock do we find a significantly positive influence. 7 Day of the week effects are not included as they provide no significant results. 8 We had two reasons for deciding against separate estimations for pre-crisis and crisis periods and in favor of a nested model. First, we can statistically test for differences across coefficients. Second, the number of observations for each subsample varies considerably (2,392 during normal times; 601 during the crisis). with the government) result in higher volatility, probably because they increase investor concern about financial stability.
Conclusions
Using a GARCH model, we analyze the influence of U.S. monetary policy action and Third, the diminished influence of communication during the financial crisis suggests that the usual "calming" effect of communication was weaker during that period. Apparently, it was more difficult for central bankers to convince investors that their actions would be effective during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that monetary policy has a larger risk effect on commodity markets than wealth effects. Thus, when building optimal asset portfolios, investors need to be aware that commodities are not necessarily a safe investment. Our evidence suggests that even tangible assets with a hard store of value, such as commodities, are subject to fluctuations in financial markets. Given that the volatility reaction of commodities to monetary policy action and communication is similar to that of other financial markets, for instance, bonds or stock markets, the potential to reduce portfolio risk by including such assets as a means of diversification may be limited.
